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Abstract. Current network protection systems use a collection of in-
telligent components - e.g. classifiers or rule-based firewall systems to
detect intrusions and anomalies and to secure a network against viruses,
worms, or trojans. However, these network systems rely on individu-
ality and support an architecture with less collaborative work of the
protection components. They give less administration support for main-
tenance, but offer a large number of individual single points of failures
- an ideal situation for network attacks to succeed. In this work, we
discuss the required features, the performance, and the problems of a
distributed protection system called SANA. It consists of a cooperative
architecture, it is motivated by the human immune system, where the
components correspond to artificial immune cells that are connected for
their collaborative work. SANA promises a better protection against in-
truders than common known protection systems through an adaptive
self-management while keeping the resources efficiently by an intelligent
reduction of redundancies. We introduce a library of several novel and
common used protection components and evaluate the performance of
SANA by a proof-of-concept implementation.
Keywords: Network Protection, Artificial Immune Systems, Bio-Inspired Com-
puting, Distributed Architectures, Information Management, Network Simulation.
1 Introduction
The attacks towards computer networks is increasing and the costs as well. In
crime towards the computer networks does 88% belong to the infections by
viruses and worms but the attacks by humans is increasing. In addition, more
and more attacks aim to receive information, which are afterwards sold to earn
money; this thread generates a cost of about 70, 000, 000$ [1]. The costs of intru-
sions towards computer networks is measured to 150, 000, 000$ [2]. An emerging
problem are the attacks performed by internal users, e.g. by unsatisfied employes
of a company trying to get access to confident information.
A network protection system is a system that tries to protect the network
and its nodes against intrusions and attacks [3]. It consists of several components
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of different granularity [4], ranging from parameter changes in sub-components,
nodes, or packet filters to powerful antivirus software, firewalls, and intrusion
detection systems in important network nodes [5]. Each protection component
contains the workflow and the knowledge in order to perform the tasks so that
the protection system converges to its goals. The protection system holds the
cooperation between the different protection components and the maintenance-
and update workflows. The performance of the protection system is an indication
how secure the network is against intrusions; the performance originates out of
the performance of all protection components.
There exist different characteristics in order to evaluate and compare different
protection systems [6]:
– The system has to be complete; i.e. the system protects all nodes against
intrusions.
– The provided resources has to be used efficiently.
– The protection system has to secure the network and all nodes. It should
also not influence the user and the normal workflows in the network.
– The installation, maintenance, and update workflows have to be easy and
fast to perform. The system has to ensure that the different protection com-
ponents work properly and are up-to-date.
– The system has to adapt to the current situation in the network and it has
to be adaptive in order to identify modified, mutated, and/or novel attacks.
An important characteristics of computer network protection systems is that
they should be extendable and cope with upcoming - more and more complex
as well as intelligent - intrusions. For example, the ZMIST virus remains hid-
den in host programs [7]; common-used detection techniques performing pattern
matching have serious problems to identify it. The EVOL virus hides itself through
swapping instructions in existing programs [8]. Thus, we demand for a protection
system to use an adaptive information management having protection compo-
nents collaborated; we demand for protection systems to be easily extendable
towards and permanent protection update.
A recent approach is to model the biological systems for computer science
where the artificial immune systems is one example. In this article, we intro-
duce first a novel framework for protection systems as artificial immune system
[9,10,11,12], which is motivated by the human immune system [13]. We then
suggest a computer network protection system called SANA, present its archi-
tecture, performance and some implementation aspects. An important aspect is
that SANA is a complex - but easy to understandable - system that does not use
a centralised system [14]. It provides the features and characteristics explained
above and provides a dynamic, efficient, and adaptive security environment in
which common used and novel approaches for network security are combined
[15]. These approaches are both motivated by the Biology as well as Computer
Science approaches.
2 Current Situation
Current promising protection solutions and systems contain an architecture of
different components. In each node, antivirus software [16] and firewall [17] are
installed; they observe file access, active processes, and the network packet head-
ers for possible attacks. Additionally, some nodes facilitate other protection com-
ponents like e.g. spam filters for identifying unsolicited and undesired messages.
On the network side, on hubs, switches, and routers header checking packet
filters run in order to define a network policy describing which routings, proto-
cols, and ports are allowed [18]. Important nodes like e.g. internet gateways and
email servers are secured using intrusion detection systems [5], which check each
packet completely and observe the whole node in order to identify intrusions. A
novel approach are intrusion prevention systems [19], which extend the antivirus
software and firewall to a system observing the file access and system calls as
well as checking the whole packets for intrusions. However, these systems mostly
combine only antivirus and firewalls extended by some statistical approaches in
order to detect unknown intrusions; however they are significantly different to
intrusion detection systems.
Currently, these components must be installed and configured in each node
manually where the configuration is more and more done through a centralised
management server. The updates of each protection component - antivirus or
intrusion detection system - works as follows: each component asks regularly a
central management if there exists an update; if yes, then it downloads it. The
antivirus software and the firewall ask then the user when a suspicious event
occurs; the user takes over the decision and proceeds. This is often a risk since
the user is mostly not an expert. Additionally, the antivirus software, firewalls,
packet filters, and intrusion detection systems use a log system in order to inform
the administrators about different event. The administrator analyses such, but
due to the enormous number of messages is it not possible for him to analyse
each message properly; the intrusions may stay undetected.
The different protection components are not connected. Thus, each compo-
nent works on its own and collaborative work does not exist. This leads pri-
marily to redundant checks: for example, the firewall and intrusion detection
system in a node check the packet for similar characteristics; resources are con-
sequently wasted. However, more important is that the different information
gathered through the different protection components are not combined in or-
der to identify intrusions or even to identify abnormal or suspicious behaviour.
Lastly, the protection system does not check itself whether each component is
up-to-date and works properly, which leads to the situation that different protec-
tion components work with limited performance. An example for this problem
is that the update system of an antivirus software does not work properly and
e.g. the antivirus software is no longer updated and does not identify the newest
intrusions; this is a problem because this node is a risk for the whole network.
For facilitating the required resources, distributed installations provide sev-
eral advantages compared to the classical client server architecture. In the client
server architecture, the client software - protection components - perform the
tasks and demand different updates and services from the central management
server. Some approaches for a distributed protection system exist [20], e.g. an ar-
tificial immune system for network security [9,10,11,12]. However, these systems
mostly do not use a fully distributed approach, i.e. there are some centralised
components that are critical for the overall performance of the system, the sys-
tem is mostly not adaptive, and the system does not use small entities as artificial
cells and more the multi-agent system approach [21] using heavy agents with few
mobility, lots of internal information, and lots of knowledge about the current
situation. A system is adaptive when it reconfigures itself so that it copes with
the current and future situation; also learning, self-checking, and -repairing is a
part of adaptive workflows. Furthermore, common used systems do not use an
approach where many artificial cells have to communicate and collaborate. Fur-
thermore, these systems are far away from production; this framework intends to
narrow the gap between the distributed protection systems of academic research
and production.
In the next section, a novel framework for a distributed, integrated, and
dynamic protection system is introduced in which common used and novel ap-
proaches for network security are combined and which tries to solve the limita-
tions of existing protection systems.
3 SANA: A Network Protection Framework through
Artificial Immunity
The protection system SANA [15] is a library of different network protection
components using a subsymbolic organisation and information management.
SANA copes with upcoming attacks that increase continuously adaption and in-
telligence. The administration and maintenance is simplified, it works mainly au-
tonomously. The system does not use centralised protection components, which
are single points of failure. Different components and workflows of SANA are
motivated by workflows and architectures from the Biology. An overview is visu-
alised in figure 1; the system is explained in the next sections according to this
figure.
3.1 Security Environment
Distributed systems with moving entities require an environment in which the
entities work. Therefore, the security environment is installed in each node and
provides an environment that is used by all protection components. The envi-
ronment ensures the access to resources as storage, memory, CPU, and network
as well as ensures that each protection component is recognised when a certain
event occurs. Therefore, each protection component is installed in the security
environment and registered for certain events, e.g. arriving of a packet or access
to a file. Thus, the protection components are independent from the underlying
hardware platform as well as network protocols and configurations, which leads
to a faster deployment of protection components. The security environments is
a middleware between the resources of the node and the protection components.
The security environment also provides checks testing the protection compo-
nents if they are allowed to access the resources and if they intend to perform
properly. This ensures that not properly working components are removed from
the network; they cannot access resources anymore. Additionally, the adminis-
trators can connect to the security environment in order to administrate these
as well as to access the protection components working in this node. The ad-
ministrators can quickly add novel components facilitating novel approaches of
network security.
3.2 Protection Components
The protection system consists of several protection components, which per-
form the tasks required for securing the network. These protection components
are both common used protection components like antivirus software, firewall,
packet filter, and intrusion detection systems in order to benefit from their per-
formance as well as novel approaches of protection components, e.g. the artificial
cells. The common used protection components are installed in the security en-
vironment and perform their tasks.
SANA is an artificial immune system that facilitates common protection
components; SANA is an evolution of common used protection systems. The
common used protection components are designed and implemented for a spe-
cific operating system. Thus, the platform independent system SANA provides
an environment in order to install the protection component in the security en-
vironment. The security environment provides everything for checking, e.g. the
network packets, the system calls, and the file accesses - middleware between
the protection components and the resources. The protection components check
these and the response is transfered to the real resources through the security
environment. For other protection components, an operating systems using hard-
ware virtualisation is provided wherein the protection components runs (see 3.7)
[22].
With this implementation, common used protection components as e.g. an-
tivirus software, firewall, packet filter, and intrusion detection system are imple-
mented and reused without internal changes in the components so that SANA
is a framework for a distributed distribution system. Also, non standard ap-
proaches as e.g. virus throttle [23,24] for slowing down the propagation of intru-
sions and Malfor [25] for automatically generating signatures of intrusions are
implemented.
The artificial cells are dynamic, highly specialised, lightweighted, and mobile
so that the system is dynamic and hard to attack. The cells are highly specialised
and lightweighted because they have only limited knowledge about the situation
in the network and the various tasks required for network security are distributed
over several nodes. The cells are dynamic and mobile through moving around
Fig. 1. Overview about SANA
and changing of the behaviour. The number of different types of artificial cells
is enormous - at least several thousands of cells - because the tasks required for
network security are split in small pieces so that a breakdown of one artificial
cell does not break down the whole system. Furthermore, each type of artificial
cell is several times present in the network so that redundancies occur. Examples
for artificial cells are introduced in [26,27]. Different types of artificial cells:
File Access Accessing a file can install intrusions like viruses. Thus, these cells
check each file that is accessed on the node.
Node Observation Artificial cells observe the whole node including the anal-
yse of the system calls and the control flow graphs of executed programs in
order to identify and prevent installation of intrusions.
Network Traffic Analysis This type of artificial cells evaluates each network
packet whether it contains an intrusion or not. If it contains an intrusion,
the artificial cells also know how to proceed with the packet, e.g. packet drop
or disinfection. An example is the approach ANIMA for Intrusion Detection
wherein the signatures of intrusions are stored in a network like architecture
[28].
Identification of Abnormality In the network, different examples of abnor-
mality exist. E.g. the infected nodes or not proper working protection com-
ponents must be identified and removed. AGNOSCO is an artificial cell using
the information from the distributed network traffic analysis in order to iden-
tify infected nodes using the artificial ant colonies approach [15]. Another
approach is ANIMA for Anomaly Detection, which stores a current view
of normal network traffic in order to identify and report abnormal network
traffic [29].
Regular Checks Abnormality can also be recognised using regular checks. E.g.
viruses and worms have a significant signature - e.g. files, running processes,
and registry entries -, backdoors have an significant open port with service
connected to this port, and not proper working or outdated protection com-
ponents can be identified using some checks. Thus, these cells move through
the network, perform the check, and identify the problems. When a problem
is recognised, they inform other cells in order to solve the problem.
Data Collection These cells collect information from the network, which are
used in order to monitor the network and afterwards for self-improvement
and -learning.
Other Types It is possible to implement nearly all types of artificial cells where
the limitations are that the cells should be small and lightweighted as well
as the cells can only use the resources provided by the security environment.
Using the artificial cells, it is possible to quickly introduce novel approaches;
tasks as described before can be defined and performed using some artificial
cells. For this, the artificial cells shutdown over time where the time is defined
by the administration; values for this parameter are between some minutes and
up to some hours. The systems in the network generate continuously new cells
in order to keep the population up-to-date; these systems are explained in the
next section. With this workflow, novel approaches and techniques for network
security are quickly introduced and the newest information is included.
3.3 Important Nodes
SANA contains the normal network nodes with the security environment and
the protection components installed in this environment. For helping the admin-
istrators to maintain SANA, two specialised nodes are required.These are two
types of nodes with more functionality, which are motivated by the human body.
These specialised nodes are required in order to collect more information and to
organise the system.
Artificial Lymph Nodes The artificial lymph nodes are a meeting point and
response center for artificial cells. The artificial lymph nodes are an extension
to the normal network nodes. A set of artificial lymph nodes manage a small
network part - sub-sub-network called. They have additionally the following
features:
– Collect status information about the supplied network part.
– Manage the communication in the sub-sub-network; see also the section 3.4.
– Respond to the messages from the artificial cells. Examples of the response
are to release novel artificial cells solving a problem (disinfection a node or
updating a protection component) and to inform the administrators.
– Supply the artificial cells with additional information, e.g. whether a network
packet contains an intrusion or not.
The artificial lymph nodes are redundant installed where several artificial
lymph nodes manage a sub-sub-network so that a breakdown of a few interferes
less the performance of the overall system.
CNTS - Central Nativity and Training Stations The artificial cells shut-
down over time and must be replaced by new ones, which include the newest
information as well as novel approaches of network security. The CNTS produce
novel artificial cells and release these continuously in order to keep the number
of artificial cells approximately constant. Thus, the CNTS are an extension of
the artificial lymph nodes and have the same features as artificial lymph nodes
as well as the generation of artificial cells. A set of CNTS manages a part of
the network with several sub-sub-networks included - sub-network called. The
CNTS model the bone marrow and thymus of the human immune system.
3.4 Artificial Cell Communication
The artificial cells are specialised and perform only a small task. Thus, several
cells have to collaborate in order to identify and prevent attacks. Therefore, the
artificial cell communication is introduced, which is a distributed fault-tolerant
communication protocol for point to multi-point communication. The artificial
cell communication models the cell communication of the human body provid-
ing a communication and collaboration protocol for the artificial cells and other
protection components. Therefore, we introduce the term artificial substance,
which is used for message exchanges. It models the behaviour of different sub-
stances of the human body, e.g. the cytokines and hormones [13]. Each artificial
substance contains the message and a header with the parameters hops-to-go
and time-to-live describing the distribution area of the artificial substance.
Each node manages the routing of the substances where each node has a set of
nodes; each substance is sent to these nodes when the distribution area is not
reached; this set is adapted to the current situation in the network.
The artificial cell communication works as follows: one component sends a
message, packs this message in an artificial substance, defines the distribution
area, and gives it to the network. In each node, the substance is presented to all
protection components and the right components receive the message. The iden-
tification of the right receivers is done using artificial receptors. These receptors
are a public/private key pair describing the type and status of the artificial cells,
protection components, and artificial substances. All artificial cells, protection
components, and artificial substances contain several artificial receptors describ-
ing their type and status. Only when an artificial cell or protection component
can authorise itself using the right keys of the artificial receptors, it will receive
the message stored in the artificial substance. The protection components receiv-
ing the message respond to it, and the node sends the substance to all next nodes
and the process repeats until the distribution area of the substance is reached.
The next nodes are defined by administrator and adapted by the system so that
the communication is configured to the current situation in the network. The
artificial receptors are additionally used in order to secure the access to resources
using authentication processes.
The advantages of the artificial cell communication are a distributed, efficient,
and fail-safe protocol without a single point of failure. Furthermore, the protocol
works fine for point to multi-point communication as used in network security
where a component sends a message to all nearby components of a certain type.
3.5 Self Management
The numerous artificial cells require where their tasks are most needed. There-
fore, the artificial immune cells organise as follows: each protection component
knows how much security it provides (security value). Each node calculates -
basing on the security values of each component in the node - the security level
of the node; when this level falls below a certain threshold - the threshold is
defined by the administrator and defines how much security this node requires
-, it starts a notification process. This notification process attracts other nearby
artificial cells in order to move to this node so that the security value is increased
and the artificial cells in this node are more affine to stay than to move. However,
the artificial cells still work autonomously.
For the artificial cells, performing regular tasks on the nodes, exist another
workflow; we decided to use the artificial ant colonies approach during the de-
signing of this workflow. Briefly, the artificial ants lay pheromone on the ground
when carrying an artificial prey; these pheromones are afterwards used in order
to find other nearby preys. Here, the preys are unchecked nodes and the artifi-
cial ants are the artificial cells. Thus, in each node ni exist a storage for values
for these cells where each value vni,ni+1,tj is for a connection ni, ni+1 and for
a specific type tj of artificial cell, which is identified by the artificial receptors.
When a cell performs the check in node ni and moves afterwards to node ni+1,
it increases the value for the connection (ni, ni+1) and for the specific cell type
tj in the node ni. Furthermore, the node decreases these values over time. When
a cell wants to move from node ni to another node, it can use these values in
order to identify the node, which waits the longest time for a check. The value
describes the number of pheromones released by the artificial ants - artificial
cells - where the pheromones disappear over time.
The self management increases the performance enormously because the ar-
tificial cells are properly distributed over all nodes and enough artificial cells can
still keep moving in order to provide a dynamic protection system. In addition,
the artificial cells performing regular tasks are lead to the nodes where this task
is required; this reduces the required resources because redundant tasks are re-
duced and all nodes are checked regularly, which increases the security in the
network.
3.6 Information Management
Compared to common used protection systems, the information management of
SANA is enhanced: the artificial cells analyse not only the information from one
single node, they use the information from several nodes for a combined anal-
ysis. This is e.g. used for finding abnormal behaviour or multi-step/multi-stage
attacks. Furthermore, the different artificial cells exchange information so that
results from different analysing systems are combined evaluated and used for
finding more intelligent and adaptive intrusions. Furthermore, the self-checking
performed by the checking artificial cells is done distributed so that lots of infor-
mation are gathered. The warnings and alerts are semi-automatically analysed
and processed - common warnings and alerts are automatically processed and
only novel are directly sent to the administration; They are also sent to the ad-
ministrators as summary status information when required or demanded. The
administrators can always demand a status report or snapshot from the system
in order to receive an overview about the current situation.
3.7 Implementation
A platform-independent proof-of-concept implementation is done so that SANA
can be compared with other protection systems. The simulation runs on a net-
work simulator implementing a packet oriented network - e.g. TCP/IP - where
Fig. 2. Implementation layers in a network node
an adversarial stresses the network and the protection system using many pack-
ets with and without intrusions. Furthermore, the implementation can be easily
extended and also common used protection components as antivirus software,
intrusion detection systems, and firewalls are implemented in order to evaluate
and compare the performance of SANA.
Implementation of Security Environment The implementation of the se-
curity environment is crucial. It should provide the features required to run the
protection components efficiently but it should be impossible that the attackers
use the security environment for the intrusion process. For this, the computer is
divided in four layers:
1. The first layer is the hardware layer containing all hardware like CPU, mem-
ory, and storage.
2. The operating system layer 1 contains only the core parts of the operating
system in order to access the resources. Mostly, these are the kernel and
some drivers.
3. The operating system layer 2 contains the rest of the operating system as
well as separated the SANA security environment.
4. The software layer contains in the operating system the application soft-
ware installed by the users and in the security environment the protection
components.
The different layers are visualised in figure 2. As it can be seen in the figure,
the operating system and the SANA security environment are separated. This
is achieved through hardware virtualisation. In the operating system layer 1 is
a software installed, which enables the features to run several different oper-
ating systems - guest operating systems called - at the same time. Then, one
guest operating system has the operating system running and one the SANA
security environment. Furthermore, the operating system cannot see the secu-
rity environment but vice versa, which is ensured through the implementation.
Furthermore, operating system layer 1 is so installed that it only changes when
the hardware changes.
The advantages of this installation:
When an intruder installs an intrusion into the operating system or the software
space, it cannot access the security environment through the hardware virtuali-
sation. If an intruder installs an intrusion into the operating system layer 1, the
runtime environment recognises the change immediately, quarantines the node
through a message to the neighbours, and removes itself from the node; then, the
attacker does not receive internal information from the protection system but the
administrators have to add the node to the network again. When the intruder
tries to install itself in the security environment, a change is prohibited because
this part does not change. Lastly, if the intruder installs an intrusive protection
component - either artificial cells or local protection component - it requires the
right keys from the artificial receptors in order to access the resources; without
the keys, the intrusive component cannot perform intrusive tasks in order to
interfere the network. Thus, the intrusion can itself only install in the software
part as before and has no access to the protection system SANA.
An important advantage is that the working operating system and the protec-
tion system runs in distinguished virtual machines. Thus, the protection system
checks the operating systems and software from outside and the intrusion has
more problems to hide itself from the checking because code armoring and stealth
techniques often fail when the scan comes from outside. Furthermore, the vir-
tual machines can be moved to other machines so that a user works always with
its system on all machines. In addition, the protection system is implemented
in a service oriented architecture (SOA) [30] so that more complex tasks can
be demanded from the artificial lymph nodes and CNTS using different virtual
machines. E.g. a not proper working security environment with protection com-
ponents or a virtual machine with infected operating system can be moved to
the administration computers and checked for repairing and afterwards moved
back. Another example is that complex tasks are done using an additional virtual
computer running the protection components performing the tasks.
The disadvantages of the approach are an increased overhead. However, when
e.g. OpenVZ is used, the overhead is about 1% − 2% [22]. Additionally, novel
CPUs already contain visualization techniques implemented in hardware so that
the overhead is even more reduced.
3.8 Maintenance
The maintenance is important for the administrators. The administrators de-
mand for an easy-to-use and mostly autonomous administration and update
interface where also the enhancements should be done quickly and smoothly.
Therefore, SANA provides different workflows:
Administration The administrators can connect to each security environment
in order to check the current status and administrate the distributed system. The
artificial lymph nodes and CNTS provide summary status information about the
system and artificial cells can be released in order to collect specific information,
which can be afterwards used for further analysis.
Updates The updates are done differently compared to common used systems
where a management server provides the updates and the client softwares down-
load it. The disadvantage is that the client software have to ask regularly for
new updates and outdated software is not identified. Thus, SANA provides two
different ways of updates:
1. The artificial cells are either updated through new information from the arti-
ficial lymph nodes, which are visited regularly. Otherwise, the most common
update workflow for artificial cells is the shutdown of the cells and release of
new cells with the newest updates and information.
2. The protection components are updated using updating artificial cells. These
cells are released when a new update is available. They visit all protection
components of this type and update these. The update is reported in order
to identify unsuccessful updates or outdated components. This workflow is
mostly used for not moving components.
In addition, the administrators can always connect to all security environ-
ments in order to access the protection components and update these.
Enhancements Enhancements can be either released through a new popula-
tion of artificial cells or an installation in the security environments. For the
new population, the information about the enhancement must be added to the
CNTS, which generates and releases the new artificial cells. An installation in
the security environments can be either done manually through connecting to
each security environment or through an automated process updating a set of
security environments. With this, the enhancements are quickly deployed to the
system.
3.9 Configuration of SANA
After the introduction of the different parts and workflows of SANA, this section
provides a short overview about a possible configuration of SANA on a real
network. Each network node, which are the computers in the network as well as
the network equipment, contain a security environment in order to install the
protection components. Each node contains an antivirus software and a firewall
as in a common used protection system. The network equipment have packet
filters in order to define the network policy and to close unused ports. The
artificial cells move through the network and provide a distributed protection
subsystem on all nodes. Important nodes, e.g. the Internet gateway and the email
server but also important productive servers, run additionally to the artificial
cells intrusion detection systems. The artificial lymph nodes are installed in the
network equipment so that the number of hops from the nodes to the next
artificial lymph nodes is small. There are two to three CNTS in the network
releasing continuously novel artificial cells. The self management organises the
artificial cells and guarantees a certain amount of security in each node. The
artificial cell communication enables the cooperation between the different cells.
All other parts are implemented as described above.
4 Performance and Results
The performance of SANA is more than acceptable. It performs mostly bet-
ter than common used protection systems, which are a collection of protection
components, because SANA also uses the same protection components. Addi-
tionally, it contains the artificial cells providing a dynamic and adaptive part.
Furthermore, SANA provides using the security environment an easy to admin-
istrate protection system that has many autonomous workflows. The warnings
and alerts of each protection component are analysed and processed automati-
cally by other protection components in order to adapt the behaviour - a more
sophisticated information management. Therefore, different workflows are used:
first, the information from the protection components are combined in order to
identify infected nodes and abnormal behaviour; second, the infected nodes are
disinfected and abnormal behaviour is observed; third, the warnings and alerts
are sent to the nearby artificial cells which adapt their internal thresholds accord-
ingly - implementation of the danger model; the danger model is an biological
motivated approach where the cells exchange continuously summary status in-
formation in order to adapt their internal thresholds [31,32]. Furthermore, the
protection system is highly dynamic: the artificial cells move continuously and
provide a hard to predict and to attack protection system. Furthermore, the
system can be quickly extended with novel approaches for network security.
In the simulations, real network attacks are modelled where e.g. different
worms use the network to propagate and the aim of the worm is to infect as
many nodes as possible. Two simulations are performed: the first with a common
used protection system consisting of antivirus software, firewall, packet filter, and
intrusion detection system, and a second with SANA. In all of our simulations
SANA is more secure than the common used protection system. Furthermore,
SANA adapts to the current situation because identification of infected nodes,
not proper working components, and suspicious behaviour is detected and the
problems are fixed automatically.
Especially, when an intrusion uses the network for propagation and an intru-
sion detection system checks the traffic between the network and the internet,
the worm can easily infect the whole network because there is not an internal
protection system that stops it. In this case, SANA’s artificial cells protect the
nodes through distributed intrusion detection and disinfection of infected nodes.
In the introduction, different criteria are introduced and SANA meets these:
– Due to the installation in all nodes SANA secures the whole network. The
configuration and the self management ensures that each node is properly
secured. All intrusions are not identified, which is the ideal performance of
a protection system. However, SANA identifies almost all intrusions.
– The system uses the resources efficiently from all nodes. Thus, the required
resources on a single node is reduced when SANA is used.
– For the third criteria, the system should secure all nodes as well as it should
not influence the normal production. These two criteria are met because
SANA is installed on each node and uses only limited resources so that the
normal production is not influenced. Furthermore due to its autonomous
workflows SANA asks only rarely the user for critical security issues.
– The CNTS release regularly artificial cells, which check, repair, and update
the different protection components for proper working - self-checking and
-repairing. Furthermore, the installation is simplified because in each node
must only the security environment installed and the protection components
find a common infrastructure. Due to the enormous number of artificial cells
is a breakdown of one cell less important for the overall performance.
– SANA adapts to the current situation in the network. Therefore, a sophisti-
cated information management is used and the protection components, i.e.
artificial cells, identify abnormal behaviour, infected nodes, and adapt their
behaviour to the current situation in the network.
After the practical implementation and analysis of the system, distributed pro-
tection systems are analysed more theoretically. Therefore, different attack sce-
narios are discussed where several attacks are nearly always successful when
current protection systems are used. Examples are that a user wants to attack
a node, shuts it therefore down, and boots from an external storage device, e.g.
Linux on an USB-stick. The protection components in this system are inac-
tive and the user can install all intrusions and other protection components of
current protection system does not identify it. SANA identifies infected nodes
quickly, quarantines the node, and informs the administrator. Other attacks are
that novel intrusions can infect a whole network because only centralised systems
identify it. In the next section, SANA is compared with common used protection
systems.
4.1 Comparing SANA with common used Protection Systems
As described in the section 2 is a common used protection system a collection of
different protection components where each component is directly installed on
the node. Mostly, all nodes contain an antivirus software and a firewall, all net-
work equipments contain packet filters, as well as important nodes are secured
using intrusion detection systems. In contrast, SANA facilitates the same con-
figuration of protection components enhanced with the artificial cells, artificial
lymph nodes, and CNTS. These enable collaborative, dynamic, and adaptive
workflows so that SANA identifies infected nodes, weak points, and suspicious
behaviour. Due to the installation of the security environment are the protection
components distinguished from the operating system. Hence, the components
check the system and consequently also the intrusions from outside so that it
is harder for the intrusion to stealth or armour itself from the analysis. Addi-
tionally, SANA can produce a static copy of an virtual machine containing the
user’s operating system so that the components check this halted system. This
static copy is also used to save evidences of an intrusions in order to find the
adversaries, which is an important legal aspect.
Other important network protection systems and components are distributed
and host-based intrusion detection systems. Distributed intrusion detection sys-
tems install in each node an intrusion detection system or install capturing parts
in each node and some centralised analysing and response centers. The second
approach has the disadvantage that a lot of traffic is required in order to send
all traffic to the analysing centers. The first approach installing in each node
an intrusion detection system has the disadvantages that a lot of resources are
required. In addition, each intrusion detection system requires lots of administra-
tion and produces several warnings and alerts, which must be analysed. Thus, the
administrators cannot analyse these and, consequently, intrusions found but only
reported to the log file are often not identifies. Furthermore, these approaches
do not identify infected nodes, weak points in the network, and suspicious be-
haviour.
Widely used in big productive and academic networks are honeypots and
honeynets. A honeypot behaves like a normal computer, which pretends to con-
tain important information and processes. Furthermore, the honeypot is nor-
mally weak secured and, thus, an aim for attacks. However, the honeypot tries
to attract the intrusion in order to trap or to delay intrusions. In addition, hon-
eypots are used in order to identify novel intrusions and generate a signature
for these. Honeynets are a network of honeypots in order to simulate a whole
network and to analyse the behaviour of intrusions in a network. Honeypots and
honeynets are not implemented by SANA. However, it is possible to implement
these protection systems in a network secured by SANA.
When a small network is used in a company and there is only few inter-
network communication, the protection system is so installed that all network
traffic is routed over a centralised node, which analyses all network traffic - some-
times this is implemented using a broadcast network or using adapted routing
tables. Then, all other nodes must not check the network traffic and the installa-
tion of protection components is simplified. Unfortunately, this approach has the
disadvantage that a lot of bandwidth is required for routing all traffic over this
center as well as the center needs lots of computational power in order to check
the traffic. Furthermore, when an adversarial has control over some nodes, the
routing tables can be easily changed as well as the encrypted traffic can be only
checked at the destination node. In addition, this configuration is static and does
hardly identify suspicious behaviour and not proper working components where
infected nodes can be identified through analysing the information gathered at
the centralised checking node.
The differences to current protection system are the workflows implemented
through the artificial cells. With these workflows, a distributed, dynamic, and
adaptive protection system is implemented, which facilitates quick and easy-
to-use maintenance workflows. In addition, the information management is in-
creased so that information from different nodes are combined analysed in order
to identify and solve problems in the system. The distributed intrusion detection
system deployed by the artificial cells differs SANA from common used protec-
tion systems; this distributed intrusion detection is analysed in section 4.5.
4.2 Simulation Results
Before different attack scenarios are discussed in detail, some simulation results
comparing SANA with common used protection system are introduced. The
simulations of this section focus on network based attacks where network packets
containing intrusions try to infect a node. Infected nodes send packets with
intrusions in order to propagate the attack. Adversaries start the attack from
outside the network but infected nodes are inside. The network is always a big
network with at least 1000 nodes.
First Simulation: A random network with 1110 nodes. Three different pro-
tection systems where SANA is the implementation of SANA using only artifi-
cial cells, NIDS is the implementation of an IDS in the internet gateway, and
NIDS&SANA is combination of both. Performance:
Percent identified intrusive packets NIDS SANA NIDS&SANA
First Simulation 48.67% 79.35% 85.13%
After analysing the simulation, the results emerges out of the design. NIDS lack
from the infected nodes sending lots of intrusive packets. SANA lack from the
bad securing of the Internet gateway. NIDS&SANA has the problem of infected
nodes, which are not removed from the network.
Second Simulation: The network is a model of a switched company network
with 1110 nodes. The configuration is similar to the first simulation. Two simu-
lations are run: the first with 75% of the traffic is external to the Internet and
the second with 25% external.
Percent identified intrusive packets NIDS SANA NIDS&SANA
Traffic 25% internal 90.64% 71.23% 94.12%
Traffic 75% internal 37.78% 74.71% 81.74%
After analysing the simulation, the results emerges again out of the design. NIDS
lack from the infected nodes sending lots of intrusive packets, which is mostly
a problem in the simulation with lots of internal traffic due to no checking of
this traffic. SANA lack from the bad securing of the Internet gateway where the
most attacks come through. NIDS&SANA has the problem of infected nodes,
which are not identified. However, it can be seen that the combination of SANA
with an IDS in the Internet gateway secures the network properly.
Third Simulation: This simulation uses the same configuration as the second
simulation but SANA uses the workflows to identify and disinfect infected nodes.
Thus, the performance of the NIDS is the same.
Percent identified intrusive packets NIDS SANA NIDS&SANA
Traffic 25% internal 90.64% 94.19% 99.20%
Traffic 75% internal 37.78% 90.68% 95.81%
It can be seen that the infected nodes release lots of intrusive packets and, thus,
the identification of infected nodes increases the performance of the protection
systems enormously.
4.3 Performance in Attack Scenarios
The performance of SANA is analysed through several different attack scenarios.
These scenarios are very common in real life. Furthermore, most attacks can be
reduced to these classes.
Worm Attack A worm is a small software, which tries to infect a node. There-
fore, it uses the network as propagation medium and exploits some security holes
on the operating system and its application softwares. These security holes are
mostly a badly implementation that can e.g. lead to a buffer overflow where the
intrusions receive root- or superuser-rights on the node. The worm has after the
infection control over the node and can collect information, erase data, and in-
terfere the usage of the node. In addition, most worms try to propagate through
sending lots of network packets containing itself or a mutated version of itself.
A famous example is the “ILOVEYOU” worm.
In order to identify worm attacks, SANA facilitates different workflows. The
network packets are checked through the distributed intrusion detection sys-
tem with lots of artificial cells as well as through centralised intrusion detection
systems in important nodes. When the worm is known by the protection sys-
tem, it will remove the packets. The check is performed from outside so that
armoring and stealth techniques of intrusions have more problems to hide it-
self. Furthermore, the information gathered through the distributed analysis is
analysed in order to identify infected nodes using e.g. the artificial cells of the
type AGNOSCO. Identified infected nodes are reported and checked by checking
cells or by the administrators. When an infection is proved, the node is isolated
and disinfected. The infection is analysed for generating signatures, which are
included in the next updates. Commonly worms install e.g. backdoors, files, pro-
cesses, which are characteristic for the worm. The nodes are regularly checked
for different characteristics of intrusions and, when a characteristic is identified,
it is reported to the administrators.
The simulations show that SANA keeps a network clean from worm infec-
tions. Especially the identification of infected nodes and abnormal characteristics
increase the performance compared to common used protection systems. The
AGNOSCO approach identifies quickly infected nodes and other cells located in
the nearby artificial lymph nodes start immediately a disinfection workflow.
Virus and Trojan Horse Attack A virus and a trojan horse attack is similar
to a worm attack. The difference is that the virus requires a host program wherein
it is included. When the host program is copied the virus is copied as well as when
the host program is executed is the virus executed. A trojan horse is a software
that primarily looks and behaves like a normal program but when it is executed
it installs an intrusions. The trojan normally does not exploit a security hole, it
facilitates the approach of social engineering where the user is manipulated in
order to perform actions. The goal of a trojan is to install a backdoor, which is
used by the adversarial in order to access and control the node. In contrast to
worms and viruses does a trojan not always propagate.
The difference between the worm and the virus and trojan horse attack are
the propagation and infection workflows. The viruses and trojan horses do not
always arrive using the network where mainly all data exchanges are facilitated.
The nodes are observed for intrusive processes, file access, and network pack-
ets through the different protection components as e.g. artificial cells, antivirus
software, and intrusion detection systems. When an infected file is identified,
not the user is contacted as in common used protection systems, the systems
analyses the warning autonomously and processes this. Only when the system
does not know how to proceed, it contacts the administrators for further steps.
The workflows to identify and disinfect infected nodes are the same as used in
the worm attack scenario.
The simulations substantiate the performance because SANA identifies and
prevents known attacks as well as SANA identifies infected nodes through the
tasks performed by different artificial cells. E.g. backdoors or running processes
are reported and removed by the system.
Multi-Stage Attack Multi-stage attacks try to infect nodes or try to gather
information while attacking using various steps. Each step is a sub-attack and
can facilitates different attack techniques. These attacks are used in order to
adapt an attack towards the protection system in the network as well as to
collect information about the deployed protection system.
The problem of these attacks is that each stage is only a small tasks, which is
normally not identified as intrusive or the task is normal behaviour of programs
- mimicry of normal behaviour. In the process of multiple stages, the attack
can both collect information as well as find a weak point in the network in
order to attack and infect the node. In order to identify the attack, the different
stages must be detected and this information must be merged. Therefore, the
artificial cells and other protection components observe the node and identify the
different stages. This is logged and the other cells and components can read the
centralised log in a node. Furthermore using the artificial cell communication, the
cells exchange continuously summary status information where the appearance
of these stages are included. Thus, the nearby cells - within some hops distance
- receive the information about the stages and can include this into further
workflows. Identification and disinfection of successful attacks is similar to the
two previous attack scenarios.
The simulations show that SANA identifies and prevents known multi-stage
attacks. Unknown/novel multi-stage attacks are identified when the stages are
similar to known attacks or the infection is found using the checking workflows.
Hacker Attack When a human attacks a network is this hacker attack called.
Also the emerging class of attacks performed by humans with internal informa-
tion belongs to this class.
Attacks performed by humans are harder to identify because the humans
behave in each situation different as well as unpredictable and adapt the at-
tack to the current situation in the network. However, different tasks are always
present when an intrusion is installed and SANA tries to find these characteris-
tics. Therefore SANA observes the node as well as the network traffic in order to
identify intrusive behaviour. Additionally to common used protection systems,
SANA combines using the artificial cell communication and the movement of
cells information from different nodes.
The simulations show that especially backdoors e.g. installed by hackers are
quickly found by checking cells as well as intrusive behaviour is identified on
several nodes and reported to the administration.
Attacks using encrypted VPN Traffic Current networks facilitate virtual
private networks (VPNs) in order to include external nodes into the system or to
safely connect external services into the network. Normally, the VPNs build up a
tunnel between two nodes where the traffic over the tunnel is mostly encrypted
e.g. with IPsec. The problem for the protection system is that the traffic is
encrypted and can be only checked on the two nodes of the tunnel where one
node is mostly external. Thus, centralised protection components present in the
network - e.g. the intrusion detection system at the internet gateway - cannot
check the network traffic due to its encryption.
SANA protects the network against the attacks using the encrypted VPN
tunnel because it checks the network traffic with the distributed intrusion de-
tection system from the artificial cells at least at the internal node of the VPN
tunnel. When both nodes use SANA as protection system, both nodes check
the traffic using the artificial cells. In addition, the node is observed so that the
installation of an intrusion is detected as well as prevented. Additionally, regular
checks are performed so that the nodes are checked for infections.
Our simulations show that SANA identifies the attacks, which use the VPN
for attacks. In addition, the self management makes it feasible to increase the
concentration of cells in these nodes because a VPN tunnel is also a risk for the
network.
4.4 Dynamic and Adaptive Behaviour
The dynamic behaviour featured by the artificial cells is crucial for the perfor-
mance of SANA. The artificial cells move and the self management ensures that
each node is properly secured. Thus, an attacker does not always find the same
configuration of the protection system and cannot be sure to use a backdoor
for further attacks. The system additionally adapts to the current situation.
Hotspots of attacks are identified and the concentration of artificial cells in this
area is increased in order to provide more security. The collaboration between
the artificial cells enables the combination of information gathered in different
protection processes. SANA also adapts through analysing infections and au-
tonomous generation of signatures in order to identify the intrusion afterwards.
These points increase the performance and are not available in most common
used protection components.
4.5 Distributed Intrusion Detection System
The artificial cells for checking network packets implement a distributed intru-
sion detection system. These cells run on all nodes and evaluate the packets
whether they contain an intrusion or not. The generated warnings and alerts are
both sent to the administrations and processed automatically. With the right
configuration, which is guaranteed through the self management, each packet is
checked against all known intrusions. E.g. in all networks each packet travels at
least three hops: sender, network equipment, and receiver. Thus, each hop must
only check the packet against 33% of all known intrusions. When the network
traffic is analysed, it can be seen that in most networks the packets traverse
mostly about ten hops and the configuration can be adapted to this. Also, the
self management can configure the system according to the normal routing paths
as well as to the routing in the network.
The distributed intrusion detection system installed through the artificial
cells works in the simulations well and identifies reliably the intrusions. Further-
more, the problem of packet loss [33] of current centralised approaches is solved
because the dataset of known intrusions in a node is significantly reduced.
4.6 Security in SANA
The distributed protection system SANA can be a risk for the network. When
SANA is not properly secured, adversaries can use the system in order to run
attacks, e.g. through propagating intrusions as artificial cells. Also, the artificial
cells can access critical resources, which are also of special interest for an attacker.
This must be prevented through a proper securing of the protection system and
its components.
Section 3.4 introduces the artificial receptors as a public private key pair
describing the type and status of all components in SANA, especially from the
artificial cells. These keys are extended to a distributed public key infrastructure:
each resource is secured using some keys and the artificial cells have to authorise
with the right keys in order to receive access. Thus, unauthorised cells cannot
access the important resources. Artificial cells introduced by attackers - so called
bad artificial cells - receive no access to the resources because they lack from
having the right receptors.
This approach leads to the next problem that the attackers cannot receive
access to the keys of the artificial receptors. Therefore, the implementation of
the security environment is important, which is introduced in section 3.7 and
visualised in figure 2. The system is organised in three parts: the hardware and
the core parts of the operating system (operating system layer 1), the SANA
security environment with the protection components, and the operating system
with the applications software. The question is, which information can be read
by the adversarial when occupying the node:
– When an intrusion installs something in the operating system layer 1, SANA
uninstalls itself immediately from this node and quarantines the node through
informing the neighbours. Thus, the intrusion has no change to receive in-
formation about the keys. Afterwards, the administrators have to check the
node and bring it back to production through inserting it in the network.
– Most intrusion attack the Windows operating system, which is only available
in the operating system part of the security environment. Using the hardware
virtualisation, it is impossible to access the security environment and to
access the keys. When the intrusion tries to break out, it has to change the
operating system layer 1, which is discussed in the last point.
– The most critical problem is an installation of an intrusion in the security
environment. An arriving intrusive protection component is identified and re-
moved. When an intrusion installs itself in the environment, integrity checks
recognise this and the intrusion is identified and prevented. Due to the small
size and limited features can the environment safely installed so that intru-
sions cannot attack it. Different techniques are e.g. formal verification and
integrity checks.
To sum up, it is hard for an adversarial to use SANA for running attacks. In
addition, self checking by other protection components and especially artificial
cells identify not proper working components quickly and remove them from
production.
5 Next Steps
There are lots of open problems and next steps in the SANA project. One im-
portant next step is to intensive the research in the cooperation between the
different artificial cells. Therefore, the goal is to use the danger theory for the
collaboration between different protection components in SANA.
In the implementation, the idea of using hardware virtualisation for imple-
menting is not enough researched. Here, the next step is to analyse the required
overhead as well as to introduce the service oriented architecture in detail in
order to analyse the novel features emerging out of this architecture.
Furthermore, to extend the library of implemented protection components
e.g. with honeyports is a next step in order to include more approaches of network
security. With the extensions, SANA is tested against more intrusions and a
testbed is built up where SANA protects a real network against real attacks.
6 Conclusion
As it was described, the protection system SANA outperforms current protection
systems. An intelligent administration and a distributed architecture with a
standardised protection environment increases its performance. The distributed
and dynamic framework makes it hard to attack and to break it completely
down. The system is easily update and extendable where also the administration
is simplified so that the system is quickly adapted to the current situation in the
network.
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